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l l . o  PERSONNEL
louring the past reporting period the research group has had several 
changes. Dr. Gerald DeJong, who recieved his Ph.D. from Yale University in 
■1979» has joined the faculty and Dr. LaRaw Maran who is trained as a 
^linguist has joined as a research associate. Our current graduate student 
research assistants are: Rick Dinitz, Jeff Gibbons, Paul O’Rorke, Jordan
Jjpollack, and David Spoor.
i
2.0 SUMMARY OF RECENT PROGRESS
i
During this contract period, we: (a) introduced new representation
^schemes called "event shape diagrams” for events and actions; (b) 
—.developed mechanisms for "explanatory schema acquisition,” a process which 
“ allows a program to learn new plans and scripts (i.e., action sequences) by 
^reading articles or stories based on the plans or scripts; (c) completed 
work on computer programs which can understand complex noun phrases (such 
|as "water pump pulley adjustment screw thread damage report summary”); (d) 
— made substantial progress toward identifying and cataloging "cognitive 
"universals" (processes and structures shared by all people, regardless of 
^language or culture) through the comparison of English scene and event 
descriptions with similar descriptions in other languages; (e) completed 
Jour investigation of methods of evaluating natural language systems, and
i
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applied the methods to our own PLANES system; 
base query language system, designed for 
language front end; and (g) completed HEXVIS, 
system for high-level vision.
(f) completed the JQL data 
easy connection to a natural 
a parallel, message-passing
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j|3.0 SUMMARY OF PROGRESS BY RESEARCH PROJECT 
J|3.1 Event Shape Diagrams - D. L. Waltz
|  We have made exciting breakthroughs in this area. For a long time, we 
have been both impressed by and dissatisfied with Schank’s use of 
^"primitives of conceptual dependency" [Schank, 1975] for representing the 
meaning of natural language. (a) Despite the demonstrated power of 
•conceptual dependency (CD) the particular primitives used have changed over 
Jthe years [Schank, e_t al■ f 1973; Schank and Riesbeck, 1981]. (b) The 
choice of primitives for use in definitions has apparently been an art, 
^justified on the grounds of practical effectiveness, but never by theory.
1 (c) The sets of primitives are incomplete [Wilks, 1975] —  they cannotrepresent certain verb meanings (e.g., divide, construct); they do not 
Jjhave distinguishable representations for many classes of verbs for example, 
(break, chip. crackr destroy. damage. and scratch would all be represented 
Jvery similarly). More recently, Schank et. & X . seem to have had little 
— interest in repairing defects of CD, but have concentrated instead on 
^developing larger memory structures, in particular scripts [Schank and 
jAbleson 1977] and MOPS [Schank 1979], each of which may contain a large 
number of CD structures.
^  Rieger’s "common sense algorithm" (CSA) work [1975] attempted to
^enumerate causal relationships between states, actions, and tendencies 
(such as gravity) for use in representing the operation of physical 
Jmechanisms. While very promising in certain ways, CSA diagrams have never 
jbeen well-integrated with CD, and have not been able to represent timing, 
quantitative state variable values, concurrency or hierarchical 
Jrelationships in a satisfactory way. Furthermore, the construction of CSA
i
Page 4
diagrams is still an art.
Adverbs (e.g., quickly, softly, hard, suddenly) have seldom been 
mentioned in AI papers on natural language understanding. When they have 
been mentioned [Cercone, 19771, they have been viewed as difficult or 
impossible to deal with. We have developed mechanisms for dealing with 
adverbs [Waltz, 1981] and have recently improved upon these mechanisms. 
Many adverbs (including the ones above) can be represented very naturally 
in event shape diagrams, though manner adverbs (e.g., viciously, kindly, 
bluntly) still seem difficult.
Recent work by Lehnert on summarizing narratives [Lehnert, e_t ¿1. , 
1981], by Allen on a "temporal logic” [Allen, 1981], by Abelson on the 
relationships between events, actions, plans, and emotions [Abelson, 1981] , 
and by Talmy on the relationships between grammar and perception [Talmy, 
1978] have all played a part in the development of our "event shape 
diagrams,” summarized below.
In their simplest forms, event shape diagrams have a time line, a 
scale, and values on the scale at one or more points. There are three 
basic event shape diagrams, illustrated in Figure 1.*
*While diagrams are shown here, data structures to represent these 
diagrams are very easy to program.
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Diagrams can be used to represent concurrent processes, causation, and 
other temporal relations by aligning two or more diagrams, as illustrated 
in Figure 2. Figure 2 shows the representation for "eat." Note that four 
simple diagrams are aligned, and that each has different kinds of scales, 
and different event shapes. Causal relations also hold between the events 
described in each simple diagram. The names for the causal relations are 
adopted from Rieger's CSA work. The action Eating stops in this default 
case where "desire to eat" goes to zero. "Desire to eat" sums up in one 
measure coercion, habit, and other factors as well as hunger. Typical 
values for amounts of food, time required to eat, and so on are also 
associated with the diagram, to be used as default values.
More levels of detail can be added if needed. For instance, the 
action diagram can be expanded so that eating involves many recurrences of 
putting food in one's mouth, biting, chewing, and swallowing, and the 
diagram for the amount of food inside the agent can reflect a series of 
stepwise changes as each mouthful is ingested.
Many adv 
shrinks the 
increases the 
half of one's 
represented.
erbial modifiers can be represented neatlye: ealt quickly
value of t.-tf O with respect to typical values; eat a lot
values of qo-qf above typical valu*5S . Similarly "eat only
meal," "eat very slowly," "eat one bite," etc. can be neatly
The point of time from which events are viewed can also be clearly 
represented. Past tense (e.g. "we ate 3 hamburgers") puts "now" on the 
time line to the right of the action, while future tense puts "now" to the 
left of the action, and present progressive (e.g. "we are eating") puts
"now" between t and t,_.o f
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No AI systems have dealt with models of human belief, expectation, and 
attitude in any but the simplest situations [Cohen and Perrault, 1981]. 
While it is premature to make grandiose claims, the examples we have worked 
on so far have not presented great difficulties for our event shape diagram 
formulations. For example, Figure 3 shows the representation of the 
apparently rather hard sentence, "I was surprised that John ate so much.” 
The structure in Figure 3 uses the portion of the preceding meaning for eat 
that is selected by the pattern eat + <quantity>. surprised has slots 
for an agent, an expected event or action, and an actual event or action, 
which must differ. In this case, we know that John actually ate more than 
he was expected to eat, so we can fill in his actual behavior in some 
detail. If the sentence were instead ”1 was surprised at how much John 
ate," it is also possible that John ate less than he was expected to, and 
the- representation would simply show that the actual and expected amounts 
were different. The "interest arousal" scale shows up as part of the 
meaning of many verbs, such as like f en iov. hate, pav attention to T desire T 
fearT and so on.
¿>P
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p3.2 Explanatory Schema Acquisition - G. DeJong, P. O’Rorke
|  Over the past year we have been working on extending a natural
•language system, such as the one described in my [DeJong 1979J, to learn 
(how the world behaves directly from experiences. Natural language 
^processing systems must have an immense amount of world knowledge in order 
to process input texts. We hope to have a computer system able to acquire 
(some of this knowledge for itself.
£  The proposed learning method, called Explanatory Schema Acquisitionf
is a form of learning from direct experience. It will enable a system to 
(acquire and refine new schemas. This will improve processing efficiency
I
L
I
and extend the range of processing applicability.
The following example illustrates the kind of approach we are taking
oward schema acquisition. In this example, from the domain of natural 
language understanding, our proposed system will learn the schema for 
kidnapping. We assume that the system does not yet have a schemas for 
(kidnapping or extortion or any similar notion. As this is a knowledge
based approach, the system does, however, possess a considerable quantity 
of background information about stealing, bargaining, the use of normal 
physical objects, and goals of people and institutions. Some of this 
knowledge, for example, knowledge about bargaining and stealing, must be in 
(the form of schemas that the system already possesses. Example input 
story :
I
I
■
■
I
■
Paris police disclosed Tuesday that a man who identified 
himself Jean Maraneaux abducted the 12 year old daughter of 
wealthy Parisian businessman Michel Boullard late last week. 
Boullard received a telegram demanding that 1 million francs be 
left in a lobby waste basket of the crowded Pompidou Center in 
exchange for the girl. Asking that the police not intervene, 
Boullard arranged for the delivery of the money. His daughter
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was found wandering blindfolded with her hands bound near his
downtown office on Monday.
A KIDNAPPING schema, if the system had one, would contain information 
by which the system could judge the relative importance of and causal 
relationships between the story events. For example, a KIDNAPPING schema 
would enable the system to conclude that the transfer of 1 million francs 
is very important while the blindfolding is less so and that there is an 
important underlying connection between paying the money and the girl’s 
freedom. If the system had such a schema, processing this story would be 
easy.
By assumption, the system does not have such a schema. However, in 
processing the story the system will be able to learn a general schema for 
processing kidnap stories from this one instance. Performance on 
succeeding kidnap stories will thus be greatly improved.
The general paradigm is to view understanding as the process of 
explaining input events. The explanations can then be used to generalize a 
single event into a new schema.
In processing this example without a KIDNAPPING schema the system can 
explain some events but not others. In particular, existing schemas cannot 
explain why Maraneaux might steal Boullard’s daughter. While this is quite 
clearly an instance of taking something that belongs to someone else, there 
is no motivation for it. The daughter has no apparent value to Boullard, 
and a person, unlike money, cannot be used to acquire other valued goods. 
The system requires motivations for major volitional actions (such as a 
character invoking the STEAL schema). Therefore it is confused at this 
point in its processing.
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The confusion is resolved by the next sentence. This input invokes 
the BARGAIN schema. The system understands the motivation for Maraneaux to 
initiate the bargaining event: he is trying to acquire money which it 
knows to be a possible goal of any human. Furthermore, this provides the 
motivation for the STEAL event. Maraneaux used the STEAL schema to satisfy 
the precondition of the BARGAIN schema of possessing the item to be traded.
Resolving the confusion causes the system to invoke its explanatory 
schemas acquisition procedure. This procedure does two things. First, it 
constructs a new schema composed of a STEAL event and a BARGAIN event where 
the STEAL is used to satisfy a precondition of the BARGAIN. Second, 
constraints on the slots for the new schema are derived from the knowledge 
in the systems STEAL and BARGAIN schemas and from the story as follows:
1) the slot filled by 1 million francs is generalized to‘ be any 
amount of money.
2) the slot filled by Maraneaux (the kidnapper) is generalized to 
be any adult human.
3) the slot filled by the daughter is generalized to be anyone with 
close personal ties with (4).
4) the slot filled by Boullard is generalized to be any human who 
both has the amount of money to fill (1) and a person with close 
personal ties to fill (3).
Thus the system now has a schema that can be used to process a new 
story about a person stealing another person in order to trade him back for 
money. This is, of course, a first approximation to a schema for 
kidnapping.
We have identified four generalization techniques which, alone or in 
concert, seem to underly all of this form of learning. The four are: 1) 
schema composition, 2) secondary effect elevation, 3) schema alteration, 
and 4) non-volitional to volitional schema transformation. The above 
kidnapping example illustrates schema composition. One schema (STEAL) is
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used to satisfy a precondition of another (BARGAIN). Secondary effect 
elevation involves using a known schema in such a way that what was 
previously a side-effect is now the main goal. For example, consider grand 
larceny arson. Normally the main goal of starting a fire is to distroy the 
object. Here, however, that is only a side-effect. The owner’s collecting 
insurance money (which was only a side-effect) is now the main goal. 
Schema alteration involves changing an existing schema in some small, well 
defined way. For example, a schema describing how to turn in a screw can 
easily be altered to yield a schema fro turning out a screw. Finally, 
non-voltional to volitional schema transformation makes a non-problem 
solving schema into a problem solving one by artificially supplying one of 
the known preconditions. For example, rain, normally an uncontrolled 
natural event, can be brought about by seeding the clouds. This research 
is very new and as yet the results are very tentative.
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3.3 Understanding Metaphor - R. Dinitz
If (as some researchers have suggested) metaphor pervades the way we 
think, understand and explain our world, then an explanation of the 
processes we use (or could use effectively in a computer model) would be a 
significant contribution to our understanding of thought and memory.
Our approach to research in the subject of understanding meaning in 
metaphor can be broken down into four major divisions:
1. The Output Problem:
How could a program convince us that it had understood a 
metaphor?
2. The Learning Problem:
What happens when a program understands a metaphor that 
facilitates understanding of subsequent, related metaphors?
3. The Indexing Problem:
How would a program locate the information that might be 
useful in understanding metaphor?
4. The Transfer Problem:
How can relevant information be used for the understanding of 
a given metaphor?
1
output
that:
In examining the output problem we must consider what kind of 
we would require of a metaphor understander in order to convince us
a)
b)
c)
It was understanding the metaphors we fed it.
It was learning from the processing it did.
It represents a plausible model of human 
understanding.
metaphor
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The word "output” here refers not only to printed output proper, but 
also to any modifications the program makes to itself or its database. 
Thus the program itself, and its evolving structure, are considered to be 
part of the output —  especially in judging requirements 2 and 3«
2. Any work on the learning problem must account for the fact that in 
humans, processing of familiar metaphors takes less time and effort than 
the processing of new or unfamiliar metaphors. In other words, a computer 
program to understand metaphor, re-integrate that information into its 
network of concepts, and so be able to re-use that information to 
facilitate the processing of any future occurrences of other related 
metaphors. Some relevant questions are: How is the content of memory 
updated? What happens to old information in the memory?
3. The indexing problem is concerned with the process for finding the 
information needed to understand a metaphor. This is related to the 
process we call reminding, and to associative memory retrieval. Different 
facets of the problem are highlighted by questions such as: How do words 
refer to concepts? How are concepts related to other concepts, and to 
words which represent them? How do words and concepts remind us of other 
words and concepts? What kind of memory organization would facilitate a 
solution to the transfer problem?
4. In solving the transfer problem, we assume that information is 
stored with words and concepts in a network of schemata. The problem is 
how to use that information in the processing of a given input. 
Subproblems include limiting the extent of inferencing, choosing which 
properties are worth mapping to extract meaning from a metaphor in a given 
situation, mapping those properties between similar structures
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(projection), and sensitivity to larger context.
Work in the area of metaphor during the past year includes 
investigations of attributive sentences, scalar mapping metaphors, and 
mapping of particle meaning.
Attributive sentences are those of the type:
X is Y 
X is like Y 
X is similar to Y 
X can be compared to Y 
Think of X as Y, etc.
In the past most researchers (primarily linguists and psychologists) 
have separated the analysis of attributive sentences into two cases --
those which are literal, and those which are metaphorical. This dissection 
seems unnatural, since the same sentence may convey both types of meaning 
depending on the context in which the sentence is spoken (or written). I 
set out to find a process that would understand attributive sentences —  
handling literal and metaphorical cases in the same fashion. If all nouns 
are defined by a set of features (features are like predicates and values 
that apply to the noun), and each feature has a salience ranking (salience 
is a measure of how essential the feature is to the definition of the 
noun), then the meaning of an attributive sentence may be modeled - by a 
mapping of features from Y to X. The high-salience features of Y are
mapped over to the features of X. If they may onto high-salience features 
of X, then the sentence meaning is the predication of those features to X,
and the sentence is understood to be literal. If they map onto
low-salience features of X, then the effect is to boost their salience —  
the meaning is again taken to be the predication of those features to X,
|  Page 14
Jbut the sentence is understood to have been used metaphorically.
■
Rate = (Perceived Time)/(Actual Elapsed Time)
in terms of
|  Scalar map metaphors are really families between related metaphors,
which all seem to flow from a single analogy of some range of experience 
(and some other range of sensory-motor experience. For instance, the 
comparisn of time with Euclidean 1-space (i.e., a time line) yields many 
common English metaphors: a point of time, a length of time, a segment of
Jtime, the continuum of time, etc. Imagine that we can take the first 
derivative of this mapping metaphor, and we find that we may talk about
i  
i
(  Rate = Distance/Time
(For example: time marches on, the hours crawled by, time flies, time is 
running out, etc. Some significant questions are: which ranges of
experience are most often used in scalar mappings? What kinds of 
^transformations can be applied to these mappings in order to produce new 
mappings (e.g., the first derivative applied to "time is like 1-space" 
(produces "movement of time is like movement in space")? Which classes of 
^features are mapped in scalar mappings and which are left behind?
■
■
Particles in English are small words in English, used to modify the 
action described by a verb (e.g., "out" as in "blow out", "in" as in "turn 
Jin", and "through" as in "pick through"). Some verbs may be modified by a 
wide range of particles, each producing a different sense of the verb. 
(Many researchers and system builders have tried to get around
representation problems by designating each verb-particle pair as a
■
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separate verb sense, but there may be a more elegant solution. Each 
particle when it stands alone, has a specific meaning which can be 
described by a set of notions associated with it. For example, "through” 
carries the notions of ’motion’, that is a portion of ’space' traversed in 
an interval of ’time’ along some ’path’ situated in some ’medium’ filled 
with ’material’ in a ’pattern of distribution’. The meaning of ’’pick 
through” is not arbitrary, but rather largely determined by the interaction 
of the meaning of "pick” with that of "through". Similarly for "see 
through", "shine through", "think through", and "sit through", etc. If we 
can suitably determine the set of notions associated with other particles, 
we might develop an effective algorithm to achieve the mapping of these 
notions onto arbitrary verbs.
The three approaches above share some common threads. All three are 
dependent on some sort of mapping. Each mapping transfers features or 
notions from one domain to another and thereby derives some new meaning 
from the words under analysis. It is hoped that these mappings can be 
unified so they could be implemented by variations of a single algorithm. 
We would, of course, like to be able to argue that such an algorithm 
reasonably approximates processing in the human brain, and thus learn 
something about the nature of thought and people in the enterprise.
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3.4 Computer Perception - D. Spoor
Computer vision systems in the past have tended to concentrate on the 
processing of images usually produced by television cameras. Such work has 
generally been called picture processing, image processing or image 
understanding. Computer visual perception goes beyond images of the world 
to encompass an understanding of the world. Such an understanding would 
involve both a computer model of the world it is perceiving, built from 
visual input, as well as general knowledge of the domain of perception. 
Image processing thus plays a role in computer perception, but is driven by 
the needs of the perceiving system.
The first step in building such a system is development of the visual 
input system. This system would start with raw visual input obtained from 
stereo television cameras. Conventional image processing techniques can 
then be applied to these images in order to extract the location and 
orientation of objects of interest. Central to this extraction will be the 
focusing of attention so that the entire scene need not be understood. 
Also of importance will be the synthesis of object location information 
from a variety of measures, both stereo and monocular. The output of such 
a system would be a model of what the current status of the observed scene, 
subject to the interest of the observing system. The representation system 
used in the model developed will depend upon the model used in the 
observing system.
The observing system will contain the current model of the domain 
situation as well as the knowledge for building and changing the model to 
conform to new visual input. The concept of time will be included in the 
model as both past structure and future possibilities are dependent on 
motion and hence time. Development of the structure for the model to be
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used presents quite a challenge. High level models of the type described 
here for the most part do not exist in current vision systems. A primary 
goal of the model to be developed is that it should be useful to a natural 
language system. This means that the representation used must conform to 
the language system model at its most abstract level. In fact this 
constraint helps rather than hinders since language can suggest models of 
the physical world at the high levels where visual analysis provides little 
help. Because the model must be sufficient to represent the physical scene 
being observed the model mut be complete in the sense that all 
configurations and objects observed must be representable. This should 
provide feedbback to the natural language model designer and allow greater 
refinement of abstract representation of physical descriptions.
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3.5 Inferential Understanding - J. Morgan 
Synopsis
Our research is an exploratory study in the inferential interpretation 
of language input. The goal is to construct a theory that will, in 
conjunction with other systems, take input at user behavior and interpret 
that behavior by constructing a hypothesis of the user’s goals and purposes 
as explanation for the behavior. This hypothesis then forms the basis of 
the computer’s response. The exploratory study discussed here focuses 
primarily on the development of an inference system based on a logic of 
communicative actions.
Background
Present language-understanding and production systems, both those with 
practical orientation and those with theoretical ambitions, generally have 
been constructed to simulate intelligent behavior in a relatively narrow 
domain, with the result that generalization is either in principle 
impossible or depends crucially on significant theoretical progress on 
fundamental issues. Our long-range goal is to supplement such penetrating 
but narrow research by another strategy: by constructing a system whose
initial design is to be as general and flexible as possible, in that it 
will attempt to emulate from the beginning what we believe to be involved 
in human language understanding (for full details of our view, see Morgan 
[in preparation]). One important feature of our approach is that humans 
(hence the system we hope to construct) understand and respond to the 
utterances of others not by being ’’driven” directly by the syntax or 
semantics of utterances, but by hypothesis they construct about the acts, 
goals, and purposes of the speaker in making the utterance. This, we
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laim, is the kind of information that is stored in long-term memory, and 
this is the basis from which humans plan their actions in response to the
I utterances of others -- in particular, in responding to the needs and 
(purposes of speakers as evidenced indirectly by their utterances. (See 
Morgan [1978] (TINLAP II) for some discussion.)
i
One clear illustration of the kind of thing we have in mind is the 
(problem of indirect speech acts (see Searle [1975], Morgan [1978]), as
■
■
exemplified by simple cases like
Do you have data on F4 accidents?
The response of a truly intelligent system would depend not only on the 
(logical (yes/no) answer to the question, but on an evaluation of the user's 
— needs in light of the nature of the data. If the data is small, then a 
•reasonable response might be (depending on what has gone before in the 
^interchange) to present all the data as a response; otherwise an 
intelligent system might inquire further as to what part of the data the 
(user might like to see, and by what medium and method it should be 
— presented. While it is easy to see that an ad hoc subsystem could be 
•constructed to display just these properties for a limited range of input 
^problems, we wish to explore methods for providing general, principled 
strategies that would entail such responses in a systematic way. This 
(involves, we claim, the capacity to make inferences about the goals, 
— purposes, etc. —  in short, the plan structure 
•utterances.
i
i  
i
behind the user's
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Methods
Our present research focuses on this aspect of understanding. It 
-assumes (counter-factually) that present systems of meaning/knowledge 
representation like predicate calculus or "conceptual dependency" are 
sufficient to represent the "literal meaning" of utterances, and is 
directed mainly at the problem of constructing a theory of how humans infer 
plans/purposes/etc. behind speech acts.
We hypothesize (as do most researchers on this question) that humans 
in linguistic interchange construct models of each other's models of the 
world, and update these models on the basis of each utterance as it occurs 
in the discourse. A system with this ability must have at least:
some amount of general "knowledge of the world" 
knowledge of typical properties of human beings 
principles of common-sense reasoning
It seems clear, as well, that an adequate inference system must have some 
kind of "inference driver" —  in other words, that the inference process is 
somehow goal-directed, rather than proceeding blindly and deductively until 
all possible inferences have been made.
The goal of the present research, then, is to begin exploring how such 
a theory can be fleshed out and articulated, by attempting to instantiate 
our initial hypotheses in LISP programs, with the exception that 
"debugging" such programs will demonstrate where the gaps in our knowledge 
and the flaws in our theories lie.
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3.6 Cognitive Universals - L. R. Maran
The problems of research to which we (i.e., Waltz and myself) have 
addressed our major attention concern the apparently perplexing 
relationship between language and cognition. We are convinced that an 
initial clarification of this relationship may well lead to significant 
developments within AI efforts to represent knowledge. I bring to this 
effort a background in anthropology, linguistics, and psychology, knowledge 
of a number of southeast Asian languages (especially Jinghpaw, the language 
of a hunter-gatherer people of northern Burma), and a general perspective 
not much represented within AI.
It is widely acknowledged that developing a systematic means of 
knowledge representation is central to the whole AI enterprise; however, 
to say how one can determine what an appropriate approach to knowledge 
description and representation has remained an enigmatic question.
First of all, we have the meaning of the real-world on the one hand, 
and the representational mechanisms of natural language on the other; the 
latter must, by virtue of its representational role, abbreviate, classify 
and generalize (i.e., organize) the details of the incredibly complex and 
comprehensive real-world meaning correlates. The basic elements of 
language (whether sentential, morphemic or phonemic) and those of the 
real-world meaning correlates (whether conceptual or perceptual) cannot be 
in a one-one correspondence relationship. Moreover, each natural language 
embodies a specific system of representing meaning that is not necessarily 
shared in any uniform sense by others. Each natural language system 
organizes aspects of reality in a way that sets it apart, and because of 
this its approach to cognition very likely reflects the organizational bias 
inherent in that particular approach, and if so, it will follow that the
Page 22
world-view it projects is neither essentially complete nor impartial.
The following discussions 
accomplishments of the last 
engaged in research.
of specific problems indicate both the 
year as well as the work we are currently
3.6.1 The Encoding Of Spatial Meaning -
The prepositional phrase (PP) is the constituent in the surface 
syntactic configuration of a spoken sentence (S) wherein spatial-locative 
information is genrally specified. In the example S1 in English, the 
parenthesized component constitutes the PP.
(SI) A bird is sitting non the peak of the roof of my house.”
We have been primarily interested in the real-world information encoded 
into the nominal expression (or noun phrase) within the PP; we have made 
some progress in sorting out cognitive universal categories of spatial 
meaning in this type of phrase.
An important lesson we have learned from Jinghpaw (JP), is the fact 
that language level representation of spatial meaning is very different in 
different natural language systems. For instance, locative meaning may be 
expressed by syntactical mechanisms or by processes which are
nonsyntactical. The following examples show a basic contrast in
spatio-physical meaning concerning whole-part relationships —  e.g., a 
house, the roof of the house, the peak on the roof of the house.
(52) That house surely has a nice peak on its roof.
(53) This peak used to be on the roof of the hpuse over there.
(54) We saw a grand old house with a fantastic peak on the roof
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in Duluth last summer.
(S5) Remember that grand peak on the roof of the Athenium? Well, 
it disappeared when the building was remodeled recently.
The relationship between the peak and the house-roof in S2 and S4 implies a 
physically adhering or continuing relationship; S3 and S5 on the other 
hand, characterize a peak-to-house-roof relationship that has been 
physically altered. The first type of physical whole-part relationsips is 
COMPOSITIVE, whereas the second is PARTITIVE. The important feature to 
note in English is the fact that the specification of these two categories 
of spatial meaning are not syntacticized. The choice of appropriate verbal 
forms —  has, used to be, disappeared —  and prepositions -- on, with —  
and the critical use of the speakers (or performative) context wherein 
perceptual schemata play crucial roles; "that house, this peak, over 
there," are verbal schemata that depend on visual-gesticulative codes.
In Jinghpaw, the compositive meaning of physical whole-part 
relationship employs a lexically-oriented compound-like approach, e.g.
(56) nta magaw machyun -- "house-roof-cresting" ; 
house roof cresting
whereas, for the partitive meaning T the nouns are obligatorily modified to 
install a genitival or possessive relationship, e.g.
(57) nta-a magaw-a machyun -- "The cresting of the roof of the
house roof cresting house."
POSS POSS
The fundamental differences underlying the English-JP encoding 
strategies illustrate for us two basic facts about language and cognition; 
first, different natural languages are in effect different verbal encoding
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strategies; and second, in order to account for natural language 
understanding as such it is necessary to proceed from a foundation of 
comparative approaches. The realization that certain aspects of cognition, 
such as the compositive/partitive meanings of physical whole-part 
relationships, may be represented by syntactical grammar as in JP, and yet 
by vastly different mechanisms in others, as in English, is extremely 
important. Grammatical processes representing cognitive phenomena are not 
uniform from language to language; therefore, notions of grammatical 
universals are seriously inadequte in representing the meaning of natural 
language. Despite the fact that AI researchers have avoided the trap of 
looking to syntax for ideas on cognitive organization, AI researchers have 
not looked beyond English meaning encoding.
3.6.2 Exteriorizing-Interiorizing Perceptions -
JP also accentuates, within the Noun Phrase in the PP, its systematic 
accommodation of the real world by transparently setting up a sequence of 
nominals to represent an exteriorized perception of the location of a given 
event, and a second sequence of nominals to represent an interiorized view 
of the location. To each sequence of these nominals JP attaches an 
appropriate set of prepositions of spatial meaning.
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(S8) shi bawlung-hpe nta-nhku yupgawk-kata-de
he ball Obj. house-inside bedroom-inside-toward
N. N.
htawng dat ai 
kick release
- "He kicked the ball toward the bedroom of the 
house."
The nominal sequence N specifies an object name, "house," as if that 
object has been viewed from some distance —  hence the exteriorizing sense 
of perception —  followed by the preposition P which states that the 
inside of the house is involved in providing a location for the event. 
This sequence is followed by N2 which names the interior unit/compartment 
of N together with P2 which specifies either an exact location (at, on, 
in) or a direction (to, toward). JP provides us with a real-world model 
that is quite precise vis-a-vis, the English approach.
The point to note here is that by means of a string of noncommutable 
nominals and prepositions JP represents perceptual information that would, 
in English, be left to pragmatics or to shared knowledge. In other words, 
from the standpoint of perceptual specificity in information encoding, some 
languages are relatively more thorough than the others. In order to 
develop a viable theory of the perceptual basis of meaning understanding we 
will need to draw heavily from such languages. We continue our research in 
this area with strong commitment.
3.6.3 Final Remark -
Our current research on spatio-temporal understanding has followed, 
and benefitted from, previous work done by members of our group, i.e. 
Boggess (1978: Computational Interpretation of English Spatial
Prepositions; Report *T-75), Waltz and Boggess (1979: Visual Analog
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Representations for Natural Language Understanding; WP-20), Waltz (1979: 
Relating Images, Concepts, and Words; WP-23), and Waltz (1980: Generating 
and Understanding Scene Descriptions; WP-24).
Our approach to natural language data is now substantially expanded by 
the inclusion of non-English languages, and we have begun to have a clearer 
picture of the problems underlying the language-cognition relationship. We 
expect to be able to suggest some general models of cognition and natural 
language understanding during the current year where the added insights 
from our comparative approach play crucial roles.
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I 3 . 7  Parallel Network Natural Language Processing - J. Pollack
H The decomposition of language into syntax, semantics and pragmatics 
_has never been a clean one, but has enabled researchers to address the 
■representation and processing of each form of linguistic knowledge without 
Jregard for the others. Although the human brain is organized in a 
massively parallel fashion, the serial computer metaphor with a central 
(processing unit and fixed-address memory has been the dominating influence 
— in' models of intelligence and language performance. (It was long thought 
■that language could be processed serially through a syntax "box”, a 
^semantics "box”, then a pragmatics "box".) It seems clear, now, that 
language is processed in parallel, with all three (and maybe more) sources 
(of knowledge integrated in the decision processes [Schank and Birnbaum, 
— 1980; Marslen-Wilson, 1980]. However, there is a paradox in knowledge
■systems due to serial implementation: Although the systems should get
Jfaster when given more knowledge, they get slower! Perhaps, then, the key 
to human-like performance of natural language processing is parallel 
(organization.
( One promising and quite general type of parallel organization is a 
relational network coupled with the twin iterative processes of spreading 
Bactivation and lateral inhibition. Variations of this
|"activation/inhibition network" organization have been used to model human 
perception of letters and words [Rumelhart and McClelland, 1981] and to 
(explain aspects of human memory [Collins and Quillian, 1972; Fahlman, 
1979] and memory priming [Collins and Loftus, 1975; Ortony, 197x]; in one 
■case an activation/inhibition network has even been used as part of a
1
^hypothetical organization of the mind [Minsky, 1980], Whether the nodes in
1
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i
i
the network are used to represent perceptual hypotheses (as in Rumelhart 
and McClelland), conceptual schemata (as in Collins and Quillian, etc.), or 
active agents (as in Minsky), activation and inhibition seem to be adequate 
jjand appropriate mechanisms for finding the best hypothesis, most fitting 
schema, or strongest agent, in a parallel fashion, and without central
i
i
control.
H The research being proposed here will attempt to establish that an 
activation/inhibition network organization is indeed useful in processing 
natural language. The nodes of the network in this project will be 
^hypothesized partial meaning-structures as well as predictions (or 
expectations) for meaning-structures.
i The main problem in using activation networks lies in determining an 
^appropriate structure for the network; i.e. in the instantiation and
connection of nodes. Minsky has been criticized for not addressing this 
problem; other researchers such as Ortony and Rumelhart and McClelland 
assume an a. priori network structure. This particular research project
i
i  
iwill instantiate nodes 
|breadth-first manner.
i
i
i
i
i
i
for an activation/inhibition network in a
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I 4 . 0  CHANGES IN COMPUTING ENVIRONMENT
^ Progress has been made in several areas involving the computer
— software and hardware in use. With conversion to a VAX 11/780 computer now 
■underway, an excellent programming environment has been developed for this 
^machine. Conversion to the new machine should be quick and involve a
minimum of disruption.
^  With the arrival of the first VAX 11/780 at CSL the process of
^conversion from our old DEC-10 was begun. Franz Lisp rather than MACLISP 
is supported on the VAX 11/780 under UNIX/V32. It was discovered that 
^Franz Lisp is indeed close to MACLISP and anything that ran under MACLISP 
Jshould run under Franz Lisp. Soon after conversion was started it became 
evident that the EMACS editor developed at CMU by James Gosling was 
^superior to the standard VI editor. EMACS was obtained from CMU and 
installed on the VAX 11/780. EMACS provides a LISP syntax oriented editor 
las well as a screen management system that allows all programming to be 
jdone from inside EMACS. Soon after EMACS was up the need for greater 
terminal display capability was apparent. A search of currently available 
^terminals was made and the Ann Arbor Ambassador was selected as best 
fitting our needs. Able to display 48 lines the Ann Arbor Ambassador 
lallows several windows of reasonable size to be displayed at one time. It 
Jalso has a meta-function key greatly spreading editing.
h  Since CMU has transferred much of their software to their VAX 11/780s, 
"similar functions to those installed in MACLISP on the DEC System-10 were 
^obtained, along with expanded capabilities. Thus essentially the same 
editor and debugger available in MACLISP are available in Franz Lisp. A 
Isimilar capability file management package was also installed, as well as
1
extra system functions making Franz Lisp compatible with CMULisp.
main
deve
many
The entire VAX 11/780 system appears to offer great promise. The vast 
memory, and speedy disk input/output greatly speeds program 
lopment. EMACS along with the CMU software relieve the programmer of 
tedious tasks allowing him to concentrate more on problem solving.
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